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Abstract
Recent studies have found correlations between risk attitudes and several
sociodemographic characteristics. In this paper, we deploy an artefactual
field experiment and study whether subjects - non-professionals and fi-
nancial professionals - are aware of these correlations. This is largely
confirmed by our results for all subject groups. We show that the sub-
jects attach informational value to sociodemographic information when
assessing others’ risk attitudes. This provides external validity to the
correlations found between risk preferences and sociodemographics. A
person’s self-assessment of risk attitudes is the most helpful device for
the subjects’ assessments of others, although experienced professionals
make use of it to a minor extent than all other subjects.
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1 Introduction
The correlation between risk attitudes and sociodemographic characteristics has
been actively studied in recent years (Dohmen et al. 2011, von Gaudecker et al.
2011). These findings give rise to the question of whether subjects are aware
of the correlation between risk preferences and sociodemographic information.
It is of interest whether and to which sociodemographic attributes subjects as-
sign value, i.e., attach informational content. The studies so far only report
correlations between risk preferences and sociodemographics. Our study allows
to proceed a step further by studying how subjects assess the risk preferences
of others. If subjects rely on sociodemographics when forming beliefs about
others’ risk preferences - in particular if this information is costly - this allows
concluding that the relationship goes beyond pure correlations.
Previous evidence suggests that risk attitudes are important for decision mak-
ing, for example for buying stocks or becoming self-employed (e.g., Dohmen
et al. 2011). When making their decisions, however, individuals are increas-
ingly relying on professionals - such as doctors in the health domain, insurance
agents, and in particular financial consultants (c.f. Allen 2001, Bhattacharya et
al. 2012). In recent years, regulators have become concerned about the quality
of financial advice.1 In order to improve financial advice, some countries, e.g.,
Germany2, introduced a standardized questionnaire in the course of the coun-
seling interview in which advisees are asked to self-assess their risk attitudes.
Our research thus focuses on regulations as well; we investigate whether this
self-assessment it recognized as helpful by advisors, especially if they are work-
ing in the financial sector.
To study these concerns, we conduct an artefactual field experiment3 in which
three types of subjects participate: senior financial advisors, junior financial ad-
visors and non-professionals. In particular, we assess professionals’ knowledge
about decision making and seek to ascertain if they attach importance to other
characteristics than subjects without advice experience. Studying these groups
1A result of these concerns is e.g., the “Markets in Financial Instruments Directive” of
the European Union, which is - besides other objectives - set up to protect consumers in
investment services. In the US, the “Restoring American Financial Stability Act of 2010”
accommodates these matters.
2The exact wording of the regulations defined by German regulators can be found under
§31,4-5 WPHG (Security Trading Act).
3Artefactual field experiments use the tools of a standard lab experiment with a non-
standard subject pool (Harrison and List 2004).
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in particular allows us to explore potential sorting effects into employment in
the financial sector (c.f. Bonin et al. 2007, Dohmen and Falk 2011, Haigh and
List 2005), especially as the junior professionals and non-professionals are sim-
ilar in age and educational status.
The experiment consists of two main parts. The first part is based on a survey
conducted on the Web and a large-scale survey (SOEP) of Germany. In them,
we estimate risk preferences of certain subgroups of the population (e.g., older
versus younger, female versus male). In the second part, we run a computer-
ized lab experiment. The lab experiment consists of two main stages. In the
first stage, we elicit subjects’ stereotypes (perceived correlations) of risk prefer-
ences of sociodemographic groups (such as gender). Secondly, we inspect which
sociodemographic characteristics subjects use in the process of giving advice,
namely assessing the risk preferences of others. By augmenting the subject pool
with financial professionals we are able to study behavioral differences between
financial advisors and non-professionals.
The results of the experiment show that subjects recognize the correlation be-
tween particular sociodemographic variables and risk preferences. The subjects
are able to assess how their own risk attitude relates to the mean risk attitude
of a representative population with a high precision. Professionals in general
are slightly more risk averse than the observed non-professionals.
When forming beliefs over another person’s risk attitude, subjects are willing
to pay for sociodemographic information about the assessed person. Subjects
thus expect informational value coming from the sociodemographic information.
This finding provides external validity for studies that find pure correlations be-
tween risk preferences and sociodemographics.
In particular an advisee’s self-assessment of risk preferences and the advisee’s
gender are considered to be informative when judging another person. How-
ever, senior financial professionals attach less informational content to the self-
assessment of risk preferences than the other subject groups. Surprisingly, the
subject group with the highest counseling experience trusts less in the informa-
tion requested by regulators. Our findings are consistent across the treatments
and mechanisms to elicit risk preferences.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: In the next section (section
2), we discuss the literature on risk preferences and advice. Section 3 explains
the experimental design of the study. Section 4 presents the treatments in detail
and the results, the conclusions follow in section 5.
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2 Literature
Recent research on risk preferences has detected significant linkages between
sociodemographic characteristics and risk attitudes. It is largely undisputed
that women are more risk averse than men (e.g., Byrnes et al. 1999, Croson
and Gneezy 2009). By using German micro data (SOEP) Dohmen et al. (2011)
in addition find that individuals are more risk averse if older, married, or with
children. The authors report that individuals are more risk loving if they have
a high school diploma or higher income. However, regarding the relationship
of education or income and risk tolerance, the findings of other literature are
ambiguous (c.f. Belzil and Leonardi 2007, Barsky et al. 1997, Hartog et al.
2002). In addition, Dohmen et al. (2011) report that actual behavior is related
to answers to risk questions asked; a significant correlation between stated risk
preferences and e.g., holding risky financial assets such as stocks, smoking, and
being self-employed becomes evident. Nevertheless, these findings report mere
correlations.
One strategy to figure out others’ preferences is subsumed by ”stereotyping”,
namely subjects’ intuition regarding the variation of a single piece of sociodemo-
graphic information. Regarding the knowledge about the correlation between
risk preferences and sociodemographic information, Eckel and Grossman (2008)
study gender stereotypes. Their results are twofold: First, in line with previ-
ous results, females tolerate less risk than males. And second, the beliefs4 over
gender are consistent since women are perceived to be less risk tolerant. In
this setup the judged person is fully visible to the judging subject. If the be-
lief formation is based on groups (e.g., males) instead of individuals, subjects
overestimate males’ risk tolerance, while females’ is correctly assessed (Siegrist
et al. 2002). In terms of cultural stereotypes people perceive Chinese to be less
risk tolerant than Americans. Interestingly, the actual experimental data shows
that the opposite is true (Hsee and Weber 1999).
One of the most obvious situations in which advice is of major interest is in
financial decision making. Previous studies suggest that financial profession-
als are less prone to behavioral biases, such as anchoring effects when forming
expectations about long-term stock returns (Kaustia et al. 2008). They show
a higher degree of analytical behavior than the general population (Nofsinger
and Varma 2007). Furthermore, there is contradictory evidence regarding the
4In the literature ’prediction’, ’forecast’ and ’belief’ are used interchangeably.
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degree of myopic loss aversion of financial professionals compared to student
subjects (Eriksen and Kvaloy 2009, Haigh and List 2005). Financial profes-
sionals are better in assessing the quality of public information, while students
more closely follow Bayes’ Rule (Alevy et al. 2007). Nevertheless, artefactual
field experiments which allow observing financial professionals and students in
an identical situation are rare.
One reason why financial professionals could systematically exhibit different
risk preferences than other employees is occupational sorting. It is argued that
individuals who are willing to take more risk sort into occupations with a higher
variance in income (Bonin et al. 2007, Fuchs-Schu¨ndeln and Schu¨ndeln 2005,
Grund and Sliwka 2010) or even with a higher mortality risk (DeLeire and Levy
2004). Typically, financial advisors are paid with highly premium dependent
incentive schemes, which might attract particularly risk tolerant individuals
(Dohmen and Falk 2011, Masclet et al. 2009).
This study contributes to the existing literature by analyzing subjects’ stereo-
types of risk preferences by varying several sociodemographic characteristics.
We investigate to which characteristics subjects attach informational content
when assessing others. We are thus able to extend research on the relationship
between risk preferences and sociodemographics beyond pure correlations. This
is the first study that takes up these questions by an artefactual field experiment
as the subject pool is augmented by junior as well as senior financial profes-
sionals. This setup allows exploring differences in behavior between the subject
groups.
3 Experimental Design
Since the objective of this paper is to investigate how subjects predict the risk
preferences of others, it is vital to prepare the exposition of the given sociode-
mographic characteristics thoughtfully. Therefore the experiment consists of
two parts (c.f. Figure 1). In the first part we use survey data and evaluate risk
attitudes of subsamples identified by certain sociodemographic variables (e.g.,
parents vs. non-parents). In the second part, initiated six months afterwards,
a computerized lab experiment is employed. The lab experiment consists of the
treatments SELF, SINGLE and SIMULT.5 Subjects participating in the first
5The instructions of both parts of the experiment can be found in the appendix.
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part are denominated as advisees whereas the subjects of the lab experiment
are called advisors. In the lab, advisors perform one treatment after another.
During the experiment there is no interaction and no feedback about the pay-
off. Each treatment is performed with two different risk measures which will be
described in section 3.1.
The SELF treatment is the first step in the experiment. When coming to the
lab, advisors are randomly allocated to sit at the computers. After logging
into the experimental software advisors answer questions about their sociode-
mographics and their risk attitudes are elicited.
In the second treatment (SINGLE), we study advisors’ knowledge about the
correlation between a single sociodemographic variable and risk tolerance. The
different subsamples from part one are presented to the advisors. Their task
is to decide which subsample makes the riskier choice on average within each
subgroup (e.g., whether they think that parents show a riskier behavior than
non-parents). By this we are able to investigate the advisors’ stereotypes on the
effect of the variation of a single sociodemographic property on risk preferences.
With the data from the surveys (see section 3.2), we compare the risk attitudes
of different subsamples (e.g., whether non-parents are more risk tolerant than
parents) and construct the correct answer.
In the third treatment (SIMULT), we investigate if advisors attach informa-
tional value to the different sociodemographic properties. To accomplish this
we choose eight profiles from the survey-data of part one, which we show to
the advisors successively. The advisor’s task is to predict the risk attitude for
each single advisee presented. The profiles are presented in different modes -
RANK and PAY - which are explained in section 4.3. In contrast to the SIN-
GLE treatment, the advisors have to judge the risk preferences of an individual
advisee instead of assessing the average decision of certain subgroups. Finally,
the payoffs are shown to the advisors and the session is finished.6
3.1 Measures of Risk Aversion
Before the treatments are described in detail, we introduce two mechanisms to
elicit risk preferences.
6Before the payoffs are presented a further treatment is played. A companion paper
explains this treatment in detail (Leuermann and Roth 2012). Subjects are not informed
about the content of this last treatment before entering it. We are thus confident that it does
not bias our results.
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Figure 1: Experimental Design: Course of Action
The first measure employed is a variation of the multiple price list design (MPL)
of Holt and Laury (2002) (hereafter: HL-lottery). In order to enforce mono-
tonicity of the risk preferences we use a switching MPL or sMPL instead of the
classic design (Andersen et al. 2006) as depicted in Figure 2. In this mecha-
nism a subject is confronted with ten choices between two lotteries (option A
or option B). Option A pays e2 in the first state and e1.60 in the second state.
Option B pays e3.85 in the first and e0.10 in the second state. The payoff of
option A exhibits a lower variance than the payoff of option B. In the tenth
row the amount of the first state is paid for sure. Hence, a rational individual
switches from option A to option B once - at least at row ten. An increasing row
number indicates a higher probability that the first state is paid out. The more
rows a subject opts for option B, i.e., the earlier a subject switches from option
A to option B, the higher the subject’s risk tolerance. For the subject’s payoff
in the lab experiment, one row is randomly chosen. In this row, the lottery is
played according to the subject’s choice.7 For the analysis, we will use the first
row the subject opts for option B as the measure of risk attitudes.
Figure 2: HL-lottery as Presented to Subjects
7Although this elicitation mechanism is widely used in the literature it has its weaknesses
- it is prone to framing effects and intellectually sophisticated (Harrison and Rutstro¨m 2008).
Nevertheless, the mechanism measures risk attitudes outside the lab consistently (Harrison
and List 2004, Harrison et al. 2007).
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The second mechanism (hereafter: “e100,000 question”) applied is taken from
the SOEP panel. It provides the opportunity to cross-check our experimental
data with the large-scale data of the survey. The exact wording is as follows:
e100,000 question Please consider what you would do in the following situation: Imag-
ine that you had won e100,000 in the lottery. Almost immediately after you collect the win-
nings, you receive the following financial offer, the conditions of which are as follows: There
is the chance to double the money. It is equally possible that you could lose half of the amount
invested. You have the opportunity to invest the full amount, part of the amount or reject the
offer. What share of your lottery winnings would you be prepared to invest in this financially
risky, yet lucrative investment?
Your Decision e100,000 - e80,000 - e60,000 - e40,000 - e20,000 - Nothing, I would
decline the offer
The elicitation mechanism is an ordered lottery selection design in which sub-
jects can invest e100,000 into a lottery that doubles or halves the amount with
equal probabilities. In order to provide incentives to take the decision thor-
oughly in the lab experiment, for the actual payoff we convert the e100,000
into e2.50, e80,000 into e2 etc. The reliability of this measure has been val-
idated via a lab experiment with substantial stakes (Dohmen et al. 2011). In
contrast to the HL-lottery this design is very easy but it captures only prefer-
ences on the risk averse domain.
For a better comparability, the e100,000 measure is rescaled in the analysis.
We will present the amount invested in an inverse order and refer to it as the
amount not invested in the lottery in units of e10,000. By this, a value of
10 indicates that nothing is invested whereas the 0 means that e100,000 are
invested into the lottery. Hence, in both measures a higher value indicates a
higher willingness to take risk on a comparable numerical scale.
3.2 Part 1: Surveys
Our main goal is to study subjects’ stereotypes of the risk preferences of certain
sociodemographic groups and individuals. Before we are able to elicit these
beliefs we have to collect profiles of individuals containing their risk attitudes
and their sociodemographic information. In order to elicit the mean decision
of representative subgroups in SINGLE and to present advisees with heteroge-
neous sociodemographics in SIMULT it is necessary to obtain sufficient variation
within the advisees’ profiles. In order to collect this data we use two surveys.
First, for the HL-measure we employ a web-based survey which can be easily
8
distributed to different people via e-mail.8 This is necessary because for the
HL-measure no large-scale data sources are publicly available. The survey col-
lects risk preferences (in the HL-lottery as well as the e100,000 question) and
sociodemographic information and it ran from November to December 2010.9
Secondly, concerning the collection of decisions for the e100,000 question, we
can make use of a large-scale panel. The German Socioeconomic Panel (SOEP)
provides representative data on 20,750 individuals containing the relevant so-
ciodemographic information and the e100,000 question.10
The second and the third column in Table 1 show the descriptives of the surveys.
The data show heterogeneity within the surveys especially in the categories age,
parenthood and university education. Nevertheless, the subjects in the SOEP
survey are significantly older and thus more often have a partner and children.
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics of Advisees and Advisors
Part 1: Reference Decisions Part 2: Lab Experiment
Web survey SOEP survey Non-prof. Junior prof. Senior prof.
Variable mean sd mean sd mean sd mean sd mean sd
N 84 - 20750 - 77 - 52 - 38 -
Year born 1979 10.0 1959 17.71 1986 6.29 1989 1.06 1973 11.0
Gender (female=1) 0.57 0.56 0.52 0.50 0.56 0.50 0.46 0.50 0.18 0.39
Partner (yes=1) 0.41 0.62 0.77 0.42 0.26 0.44 0.23 0.43 0.66 0.48
Parenthood (yes=1) 0.20 0.40 0.62 0.49 0.05 0.22 0.02 0.14 0.47 0.51
High income* (yes=1) 0.02 0.15 0.01 0.07 0 0 0 0 0.11 0.31
Uni degree (yes=1) 0.59 0.50 0.21 0.41 0.94 0.25 1.00 0.00 0.63 0.49
Counsel. exp. (years) - - - - - - 1.02 1.07 10.97 8.27
Risk indexΥ 3.54 1.81 1.90 2.13 5.26 1.39 5.08 1.52 4.68 1.71
HL∆ 5.30 1.78 - - 6.81 1.56 6.33 1.78 6.32 2.08
100,000ψ 7.61 2.70 9.08 1.98 4.70 3.29 6.00 2.44 6.89 3.18
* refers to a monthly net income above e6,000 (approx. $8460) .
Υ Self-stated risk (0=risk averse to 10= fully prepared to take risks)
∆ refers to the row in which Option B was chosen for the first time in the HL-lottery.
ψ refers to the the amount not invested into the lottery in the e100,000 question.
3.3 Part 2: Lab Experiment
The experimental sessions took place in 2011 and 2012. In total 167 subjects
in the role of advisors participated.11 In the subject pool of the lab experiment
we have three types of advisors: senior professional advisors, junior professional
advisors and non-professionals. The non-professionals are mainly students re-
cruited via the AWI-lab at Heidelberg University where all sessions with non-
8See appendix A for details.
9Participants were recruited via e-mail and were asked to further distribute the survey.
For the completion of the web-based survey we raﬄed off e50 among the participants.
10We use data from 2009. See www.diw.de/soep for more details.
11The experiment involves no interaction among the advisors, therefore each advisor is
considered to be an independent observation.
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professionals were run.12 The senior professional advisors were recruited from
a German financial advisory agency and from local banks. The junior advisors
come from a banking specific advanced training institution.13 After finishing
high school, the junior professionals enter a study program in financial advi-
sory. This takes place at an applied university, and practical counseling makes
up 50% of their education. Since these advisors are currently students, their
age and educational level are comparable to the non-professional advisors.
An experimental session lasted approximately 50 minutes, on average advisors
earned e11.92. Detailed information on the subject pool is shown in Table 1
in columns four through six. A first observation of relevance is that, while the
gender division between junior professionals is nearly half-half, there are signifi-
cantly less female advisors among the senior professionals. This could either be
a result of women leaving their job for family reasons. On the other hand this
could also indicate that women, being more risk averse than males on average,
avoid the premium dependent financial sector and sort into other occupations.
A detailed description of all treatments will be given along with the results in
the next section.
4 Description and Results
This chapter describes the different treatments in detail and presents the re-
sults. In subsection 4.1 we report the advisors’ risk preferences (SELF). Then
we discuss the treatment SINGLE. In this treatment advisors were called to
predict the effect of a variation of a single sociodemographic variable on others’
risk preferences (stereotypes). In section 4.3 we present the treatment SIMULT
that investigates which characteristics (out of a given set of characteristics) are
important to the advisors. Finally, we check whether choices in the SIMULT
treatment are consistent with the knowledge exhibited in the SINGLE treat-
ment.
4.1 SELF: Advisors’ risk preferences
Procedure The SELF treatment elicits the advisors’ own sociodemograph-
ics and their risk tolerance. First, advisors answer the questions about their
12The experiment is programmed on a PHP-platform.
13We ran seven sessions with professionals - three in the lab and four on-site - under identical
conditions.
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sociodemographics. Then they play the e100,000 question and the HL-lottery.
Both measures are incentivized as described in section 3.1.
Results The distributions of the advisors’ choices in both risk elicitation
mechanims are presented in Figure 3, separately for each advisor group.14 The
two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for distribution equality reveals that we
cannot observe a statistically significant difference between choices of senior
and junior professionals for the e100,000 question. On the contrary, non-
professionals exhibit a significantly different distribution compared to both
groups of professionals. This is also backed by the means of the choices in every
subgroup. The amount not invested is significantly lower for non-professional
advisors (around e47,000) than for professionals. Again, no difference between
senior and junior professionals can be observed; junior professionals do not in-
vest e60,000, senior professionals around e69,000 (c.f. Table 1) on average.
Compared to the mean choice of the SOEP survey population (c.f. Table 1),
we find that all advisor groups are less risk averse on average.
No obvious pattern of advisors’ risk attitudes in the HL-lottery for the different
types exists, neither for the distribution of choices nor for the means as pre-
sented in Table 1. The intersection of the risk neutral prediction (black solid
line) with the actual distribution of subjects’ choices in Figure 3 indicates that
up to 13% of the advisors exhibit risk loving choices.15 On average, however,
the advisors exhibit risk averse preferences.
Apparently, the relative payoffs - namely the earnings in the experiment com-
pared to the actual income - of advisors in the experiment could matter. In par-
ticular senior professionals with a significantly higher income could be affected.
However, previous evidence suggests that even unincentivized lottery choices
correlate with actual behavior or behavior in incentivized choices (Dohmen et
al. 2011). If the actual income matters, junior professionals should exhibit pref-
erences similar to those of non-professionals, as their income is similar. However,
we observe that junior and senior professionals exhibit similar choices, which
underlines the occupational sorting argument.
14As previously outlined, for the e100,000 question we present the amount not invested in
the lottery on a scale from 0 to 10. For the HL-lottery, the row in which option B is chosen
for the first time is presented. An increasing row number indicates a higher degree of risk
aversion.
15This is similar to Holt and Laury (2002), who find 20% of subjects to exhibit risk loving
choices.
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Figure 3: Advisors’ Risk Attitudes in e100,000 question and HL-lottery
4.2 SINGLE: Variation of a Single Characteristic
Procedure At first, after finishing the SELF treatment, advisors move on to
SINGLE. In the first task, we are interested in finding out whether advisors
are able to locate their own risk attitudes in the (representative) distribution
of risk preferences. We ask the advisors to assess whether their own decision in
the two preference elicitation tasks is riskier, less risky, or bears the same risk
compared to the advisees’ average decision in the surveys of part 1. Advisors
are informed that in a pretest, subjects answered the e100,000 question and
the HL-lottery.16
Secondly, we study stereotypes of risk preferences of different subsamples. The
exact wording and the different subsamples are presented in Table 2. The advi-
sors’ task is to predict correctly the subsample that makes the riskier decision.
To determine whether the advisors’ stereotypes are correct, we use the data from
the surveys of part 1. The average decisions of different subsamples formed in
the categories in ’age’, ’gender’, ’family status’, ’education’, ’parenthood’ and
’income’ are computed. Two subsamples are formed per category, i.e., charac-
teristic. For these we calculate the average decisions and infer which subsample
takes the riskier decision. For example, we compute the average decision among
advisees that are 40 years old and above and the average of advisees that are
below 40 years of age. The averages are computed for both risk measures sep-
arately.
In Table 2 an asterisk (triangle) indicates the subgroup that makes the decision
16For the HL-lottery we use the average choices in the web survey to determine the advisees’
average decision, for the e100,000 question choices from the SOEP survey are employed. How-
ever, only the SOEP survey constitutes a representative sample of the German population.
As mentioned above, no large representative surveys are available for the HL-lottery.
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that embodies more risk for the HL-lottery (the e100,000 question).17
In total, there are fourteen questions to answer: One regarding the assessment
of the advisor’s own risk preferences compared to the mean decision of the ref-
erence group and six about the specific subgroups, each for both risk measures.
Each question pays e0.25 if answered correctly and zero otherwise.
Table 2: SINGLE: Average Choices of Subsamples
e100,000 question: Which group invested more money in the lottery?
HL-lottery: Which group switched to option B earlier?
Category Choice 1 Choice 2 Choice 3
Age younger than 40*∆ 40 and older both equal
Gender male*∆ female both equal
Family status single*∆ partner/married both equal
Education university degree*∆ no university degree both equal
Parenthood having no children*∆ having children both equal
Net income up to e1,000* more than e1,000∆ both equal
The riskier average decision (= the correct answer) as computed from the web survey (HL-lottery) and the
SOEP survey (e100,000 question) is denoted by an asterisk (*) for HL and by a triangle (∆) for the
e100,000 question.
Results: Risk Preferences Relative to the Population Mean Figure 4
shows the percentage of advisors which are able to locate themselves correctly
in the distribution of risk preferences. The figure is split up into the different
subject groups and the two elicitation instruments. On the left, the fractions
of correct answers in the e100,000 question are presented. The results indicate
that over three quarters of the non-professionals and the junior professionals
rank their risk tolerance relative to the mean choice of the subjects in the
web survey and SOEP survey correctly.18 For senior professionals this value is
lower but still amounts to 63%. Decisions in the HL-lottery in the right part
show a similar pattern. Approximately 60% of the professionals and 67% of
non-professionals assess their risk tolerance correctly. However, no statistically
significant difference can be observed between the subgroups.
17The decisions of two samples differ only in the income variable. This is in line with the
ambiguous findings in the literature. Hartog et al. (2002) find that risk aversion decreases
in income and wealth. In contrast to that, Barsky et al. (1997) identify an inverse U-shape
relation of risk aversion and income.
18As there are three possible answers, random answering would result in 33% of correct
answers.
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Figure 4: Advisors’ Self-assessment Compared to Reference Group
Note: The columns denote the percentage of advisors that are
able to correctly answer the question ”What do you think, did
people in the pretest invest more, less or the same amount re-
spectively switch earlier, later or at the same point as you?”
split by the mechanism of elicitation. Answers of the partici-
pants in the SOEP and web survey are framed as pretest.
Results: Risk Preferences and Stereotypes Table 2 outlines the different
subsamples and their attitudes towards risk. In Figure 5 we present the fraction
of advisors who are able to identify this correlation correctly in the experiment.
The column labeled ’avg. correct’ displays the average of correct answers sum-
marized over all six categories. It is followed by the fraction of correct answers
in the six different subsamples.
On average, for the e100,000 question, the stereotypes of the junior profes-
sionals coincide significantly more often with the correlations in the subsamples
than for the other subjects - the stereotypes of the non-professionals signifi-
cantly more often than the stereotypes of senior-professionals. Regarding the
HL-lottery, again junior professionals on average answer the most questions
correctly, followed by non-professionals and senior professionals. Over both
elicitation mechanisms, junior professionals recognize the correlation between
sociodemographic information and risk preferences with significantly higher pre-
cision than non-professionals or senior professionals.
Considering the category ’gender’ in Figure 5, nearly all advisors are aware of
the fact that men tolerate more risk than women; in the e100,000 question
even 100% of junior professionals judge this correctly. On the other hand, in
the HL-lottery mechanism 61% of the senior professionals correctly believe that
males, on average, tolerate more risk. Considering the categories ’age’, ’fam-
ily status’ or ’parenthood’, around 70% to nearly 100% of advisors assess the
statistical relationship in the e100,000 question correctly. The percentage of
14
Figure 5: Distribution of Correct Answers
Note: The columns denote the percentage of advisors that are able to correctly answer the question ”What
do you think, on average, which of the two groups invests more/ switches earlier, or do both groups switch
at the same time/invest the same amount?”. The categories below the columns denote the correct answers,
namely the subgroups that are found to take riskier decisions in the SOEP and web survey. The column “avg.
correct” averages the correct answers over the six characteristics per risk elicitation mechanism.
correct answers is lower for the HL-lottery in these categories with around 50
to 90%.
Whereas the data delivers fairly clear results for the first four categories, in the
’education’ and ’income’ category the results are less clear.19 Approximately
20% of the non-professionals and 30 - 40% of the professional groups identify the
effect of a university degree correctly.20 While in the e100,000 question 50% to
65% are aware of the correct correlation with ’income’, for the HL-lottery less
than 30% of answers are accurate. The ’income’ category is a special case as the
correct answer is “high income” to the e100,000 question and “low income” to
the HL-lottery. Our study finds that only 7% recognize this pattern correctly
and answer that a different subgroup exhibits the riskier choice.
By choosing the answer “both groups switch at the same time/invest the same
19If advisors chose their answers randomly from the three possible answers, the percentage
of correct answers (in expectation) would amount to 33%. In both mechanisms beside for
income and education a t-test rejects the null-hypothesis that the presented fractions equal
33% at reasonable levels of significance. If we consider that people randomly answer except for
the answer ”both equal”, this would amount to a 50:50 chance of answering. In all categories,
the fractions of correct answers of junior and non-professionals are significantly different from
50% except for income and education.
20Regarding education, the correlations found in the literature are - as for income - am-
biguous. Dohmen et al. (2011) show that higher educated people are more risk tolerant. In
contrast to that, Belzil and Leonardi (2007) find only modest evidence for the hypothesis that
higher risk tolerance relates to higher education levels, whereas Barsky et al. (1997) find a
U-shaped relationship between completed years of education and the willingness to take risk.
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amount” advisors indicate that they do not or cannot attach any informational
value to this sociodemographic information. Figure 6 shows the percentage of
advisors per subgroup and preference elicitation mechanism averaged over all
categories choosing this option. The results indicate, first, that junior profes-
sionals significantly pick this option less frequently, namely on average in 7%
(e100,000 question) and 14% of cases (HL-lottery). The other groups choose
this option nearly twice as often. Second, in the HL-lottery, the option “both
groups switch at the same time/invest the same amount” is employed signifi-
cantly more often than in the e100,000 question.
In summary, we find that advisors are able to identify their own risk attitude
relative to the risk preferences of the average choices in the surveys. The stereo-
types regarding gender, age, partner and parenthood widely coincide with the
correlations of the surveys, while this is not the case for income and education.
Overall, junior professionals appear to have the highest degree of coherence in
the stereotypes.
Figure 6: Distribution of Answer “both equal”: e100,000 Question and HL-
Lottery
Note: Answer the question ”What do you think, on aver-
age, which of the two groups invests more/switches earlier,
or do both groups switch at the same time/invest the same
amount?” with “both groups switch at the same time/invest
the same amount”, averaged over all categories and split by
advisors’ type and elicitation mechanism.
4.3 SIMULT: Which Characteristics are important?
In this section we analyze the sociodemographic characteristics to which (if at
all) advisors attach informational value when assessing the risk attitude of an
advisee.
Procedure In contrast to the SINGLE treatment, in SIMULT the advisors
have to assess individual profiles of advisees. We chose eight profiles from the
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web survey data of part one to use them as advisee profiles. Each profile con-
tains data on seven sociodemographic characteristics as shown in Table 3. The
advisors are informed which menu of information is provided for each category.
The advisor’s task is to assess the advisee’s choice in the two risk measures
correctly. If the advisor’s prediction is correct, it pays off e0.50 for each risk
measure. Each advisor has to assess all eight advisee profiles. An example for
such a profile would be a married man with children and university degree, aged
64, and with an income over e6,000.
However, to the advisor not the whole set of sociodemographic characteristics is
necessarily available when making the prediction. We used two modes (RANK,
PAY) in order to present the advisees’ information to the advisors. Each ad-
visor has to assess four advisee profiles in RANK and four advisee profiles in
PAY. The order of the eight profiles is randomly assigned.
Table 3: Categories Provided in RANK and PAY
Age Age in years
Education University, Master, training, in training, no formal training
Family status single, partner, married, divorced, living separated, widowed
Gender male, female
Net income up to e1,000, e1,001-e3,000, e3,001-e6,000, more than e6,000
Parenthood having children, having no children
Risk Index Self-assessment of risk with the question: Regarding financial mat-
ters, are you generally a person who is fully prepared to take risks
or do you try to avoid taking risks?(0=risk averse to 10= fully
prepared to take risks)
RANK We are interested in the informational value advisors attach to the
different sociodemographic characteristics. In this mode, advisors can influence
the probability with which characteristics are shown to them. We ask the advi-
sors to rank the seven characteristics of Table 3. The ranking has to be stated
at the beginning of the treatment. For example, an advisor states: 1. age, 2.
gender, 3. income, 4. risk index,.... In the following the computer draws a
random number between 1 and 7. If, for example, the number is two and the
ranking is as in the example above, the advisor would see the following infor-
mation about the advisee: age: 64 years old, gender: male.
As presented in the timeline in Figure 7, each advisor states the ranking once
before assessing the four advisees. The same advisor’s ranking is applied to all
four advisees. However, for each advisee we draw a separate random number
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that determines how many characteristics are seen. This means that advisors
could see the ’age’ and ’gender’ of the first advisee but ’age’, ’gender’ and ’in-
come’ for the second advisee. The probability that a category is visible is strictly
higher if ranked higher. The category ranked first is definitely seen.
Figure 7: Course of Action in RANK and PAY
PAY In the second mode PAY advisors can freely choose which characteristics
are presented to them. In contrast to RANK, the advisors have to pay for each
category in each profile (c.f. Figure 7) separately. The characteristics are priced
according to a convex pricing rule. While the first characteristic costs e0.01
buying all seven characteristics amounts to a total price of e0.99.21 This means,
for example, that an advisor pays e0.06 if he or she wants to see ’age’, ’gender’
and ’income’. For each new profile advisors can make their payment decision,
which amounts to four decisions. Advisors can win a maximum of e1 per profile
by assessing both risk questions correctly. The total price of the characteristics
therefore never exceeds the maximum earnings. In contrast to the RANK treat-
ment, it is not possible to obtain a ranking over the bought characteristics in
this treatment. The advisor’s observed decisions to buy a characteristic indicate
the informational value coming from this sociodemographic characteristic.
Results: RANK As outlined above, in the RANK treatment advisors state
a ranking to affect the probability that a category is visible. Figure 8 displays
the average rank of these categories assessed by the three groups of advisors
21Price for the second characteristic: e0.02, the third: e0.03, the fourth: e0.06, the fifth:
e0.12, the sixth: e0.24, the seventh: e0.50. Since advisors earn at least e4 before entering
the treatments in SIMULT, we insure that there are non-negative net earnings. Advisors are
informed about this.
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separately.22 Table 4 shows the significance of differences between ranks ac-
cording to the Joanes’s rank sum test23 and displays the average position of the
ranked category.
For the highest average rank, we observe agreement among the groups that ’risk
index’, the self-assessment of risk preferences regarding financial matters, is on
average the most important category. While 64% of the non-professionals and
58% of the junior professional choose ’risk index’ on the first position, only 32%
of senior professionals do so. In addition, the average rank of the risk index is
significantly lower for senior professionals than for the other two groups. All
advisors on average agree that ’gender’ and ’income’ are ranked on the second
or third position, while for ’family status’, ’education’, ’parenthood’ and ’age’,
no clear pattern can be observed.
Figure 8: RANK & PAY
RANK: Average Rank of Category PAY: Bought Category
Table 4: Joanes Rank Sum Test
*** indicate a significance level of 1%, ** of 5% and * of 10% (c.f. Christensen et al. 2006)
The rank sum test in Table 4 confirms these findings. It indicates that the
average rank of the risk index is significantly different from the rank of ’age’,
22For the interpretation, a ”higher” average rank indicates that the respective variable is
ranked at a position that is revealed more often. A rank of 2 is thus “higher” than a rank of
3.
23This test takes the difference in the total rank sum of the objects as an indicator of
significant differences in ranks (Joanes 1985).
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’parenthood’, ’education’, ’family status’ and ’income’ at the 1%-level for non-
professionals and junior professionals. However, the average rank sum is not
significantly different from ’gender’ for non-professionals. The rank of gender is
significantly different from ’age’, ’parenthood’, ’education’ and ’family status’
at least at the 10%-level for non-professionals and junior professionals. Junior
professionals consider the information regarding the correlation between risk
preferences and parenthood less valuable, because this category significantly
ranks at the last position. Regarding senior professionals, the significance of
the differences in the ranks is lower, although ’risk index’, ’income’ and ’gender’
are significantly different from several other categories, especially, ’age’ and
’parenthood’.
We check whether the fact that advisors do not or cannot attach informational
content to a variable in the SINGLE treatment, i.e., choosing “both groups
switch at the same time/invest the same amount” as an answer, has an influence
on the ranking decision. Table 5 shows the results of an OLS regression. As a
dependent variable we include the rank of a certain category. The independent
variables carry a value of one if in the treatment SINGLE, the advisor’s answer
is “both equal” for the specific category.24 Standard errors are clustered at
the advisors level and separate regression for the answers in the HL-lottery and
the e100,000 question of the SINGLE treatment are executed. Furthermore, we
control for the advisors’ type by including dummy variables for junior and senior
professionals. The positive sign of the coefficient ’SINGLE’ indicates that if the
informational content of a sociodemographic variable is not clear to the advisor,
indeed, the variable ranks lower. In other words, if an individual attaches
informational content to a category, the category is likely to rank at a higher
position. The results thereby confirm consistency of behavior across treatments.
The coefficients are remarkably close in both regressions, consistency across
mechanisms is thus confirmed as well.
Optimal Ranking Given the design of the experiment, the optimal ranking
decision is of interest. A prerequisite to answer this from a theoretical stand-
point would be information on the subject’s perceived correlations between the
ranked characteristics. However, this information can not be observed. There-
24Note that in the SINGLE treatment, the effect of the variable risk index has not been
answered.
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Table 5: Informational Content and Decision on Ranking of Variables
Risk measure 100,000 HL
SINGLE 0.644*** 0.654***
(0.155) (0.123)
Constant 4.178*** 4.134***
(0.049) (0.053)
Observations 1,002 1,002
R2 0.016 0.021
Controls for advisors’ type YES YES
Note: OLS regression. *** indicate significance at the 1%-level. De-
pendent variable: Rank of sociodemographic variable in treatment
RANK. Six choices (the effect of the risk index has not been asked in
the SINGLE treatment) in the SINGLE treatment per risk elicitation
mechanism and 167 advisors in total sum up to 1002 decisions. SIN-
GLE takes a value of one if the decision in the SINGLE treatment
is “both equal” for the respective category. Clustered standard er-
rors on advisors are employed. Category left out when controlling for
advisors type: Non-professional.
fore we provide an empirical explanation to this. An advisor expects to see
four (3.5 which is rounded to the next integer) categories. Given the SOEP
data, we run regressions for any combination of four variables to explain the
e100,000 question. The combination of ’risk index’, ’gender’, ’year of birth’ and
’education’ jointly explain most of the variation of the answer in the e100,000
question. Hence, from an empirical perspective, it would be an optimal strategy
to place these four variables on the first four ranks. Figure 8 shows that risk
index and gender are - on average - on the first two ranks. Education and age
however, are not allocated optimally.
Overall, the results of the RANK treatment show that the ’risk index’ ranks at
the first position, and is observed as the most important characteristic on aver-
age. ’Gender’ and ’income’ rank with lower significance at the second or third
position by all groups of participants. For all other categories no clear-cut and
statistically significant distinction between ranks can be identified. Although
especially for ’income’ and ’education’ the knowledge about the correlation with
risk preferences as shown in the SINGLE treatment is less pronounced as for the
other categories, ’income’ is chosen at a high ranks. The senior professionals’
choices indicate a less obvious ranking among the categories. Results from the
SINGLE treatment and the RANK treatment are consistent as categories with
unknown informational content in the SINGLE treatment (i.e., choosing the
answer ’both equal’) rank lower in the RANK treatment.
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Results: PAY Since the advisor is free to buy each sociodemographic vari-
able for every advisee profile separately, in total, four payment decisions have
to be made. On average, 2.93 categories per profile are bought. The average
number of categories seen in the RANK treatment is 3.88. Thus advisors in
the PAY treatment have significantly less variables at hand than in the RANK
treatment. Non-professionals buy 2.74 categories, junior professionals 2.91. In
contrast, senior professionals purchase significantly more categories, on average
3.33. Over the four decisions, the number of categories bought does not differ
significantly. The percentage of advisors buying certain categories is similar
over the four purchase decisions of the treatment. This indicates that advisors
are confident in their choice of categories. It is also reasonable since the advisors
do not get any feedback about their success in the assessment, so learning effects
from being informed about the correct belief cannot occur. However, subjects
might discover which characteristics are more helpful than others when forming
their belief, but given the results, this is obviously not the case.
Averaged over all four rounds, Figure 8 shows the fraction of subjects that buy
a certain category for every subject type. Table 6 shows the significance levels
of a paired t-test on the purchase differences in the bought categories. The
row named ’Position’ indicates the position of the characteristic according to
the percentage of advisors buying it. In line with the RANK treatment, ’risk
index’ is the most important category, bought significantly more often than any
other category (in 83% of the cases). While most of the advisors choose the
’risk index’, ’gender’ is bought by the second largest group of advisors. For
non-professionals, the distribution of the categories in the PAY treatment is
similar to the distribution in the RANK treatment. ’Gender’ ranges at the sec-
ond position and is bought significantly more often than the ’income’ category.
For ’income’, ’family status’, and ’parenthood’ no clear-cut statements can be
made.
For the junior professionals, the categories can be divided into two subgroups
in which no significant purchase differences can be observed. The categories
’gender’, ’income’ and ’age’ are bought in more than 45% of cases. In contrast
’education’, ’family status’ and ’parenthood’ are less valuable to this advisor
group and bought significantly less often (each less than 27%). For the senior
professionals, as observed in the RANK treatment, the distribution of choices is
rather uniform apart from the risk index. ’Gender’, ’income’, ’age’, ’parenthood’
and ’family status’ are bought in 40 to 53% of the cases, and only ’education’ is
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Table 6: PAY: Test of Differences in Categories Bought
*** indicate a significance level of 1%, ** of 5% and * of 10% of a paired t-test.
bought significantly less often (30%) than ’age’ and ’income’. Consistent with
the RANK treatment, senior professionals buy the ’risk index’ significantly less
often than advisors of the other two groups.
Most important, the fact that on average three categories are bought demon-
strates that advisors attach informational value to sociodemographic informa-
tion. Our results suggest that advisors perceive a causal relationship between
the categories, i.e., characteristics, they buy and the risk measure. This finding
generates external validity for the empirical literature that finds correlations
between sociodemographic information and risk attitudes, but so far cannot
report a causal interpretation (c.f. Dohmen et al. 2011, von Gaudecker et al.
2011).
As in the RANK treatment, we check whether the fact that advisors do not
attach informational content to a variable in the SINGLE treatment has an
effect on the purchase decision. Table 7 shows the results of a probit regression.
Here, as the dependent variable we include the investor’s choice to buy a certain
category for the first profile of treatment PAY.25 In line with previous findings,
the results indicate that if the informational content is not clear to the advisor,
indeed, the variable is bought up to 16.3% less often.
To strengthen our results and to verify that behavior in the overall experiment
is consistent, we investigate whether choices in the RANK and PAY treatments
coincide. Figure 9 presents the fraction of advisors in PAY that buys a category
given its rank in the RANK treatment.26 The figure indicates, e.g., that 88%
of advisors in the PAY treatment buy the category which they rank on the first
position in the RANK treatment. The higher a category ranks, the higher is the
25Regressions with the purchase decisions in round 2 to 4 reveal similar results.
26We display the choice for the purchase decision of the first profile. Figures for purchase
decisions 2 to 4 are similar.
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Table 7: Informational Content and Decision to Buy
Risk measure 100,000 HL
SINGLE -0.161*** -0.103***
(0.036) (0.037)
Observations 1,002 1,002
Pseudo R2 0.019 0.013
Controls for advisors’ type YES YES
Note: Probit regression, results are marginal effect. *** indicate sig-
nificance at the 1%-level. Dependent variable: Choice in treatment
PAY, first round, to buy a category. SINGLE takes a value of one if
the decision in the SINGLE treatment is “both equal” for the respec-
tive category. Clustered standard errors on advisors level. Category
left out when controling for advisors type: Non-professional.
probability that it is bought. Characteristics at the seventh rank are bought
by less than 15% of advisors. The differences between the purchase decisions of
rank one to six are significantly different at least at the 10% level. No significant
difference can be observed for the last two ranks.
The results from the PAY treatment are threefold. First, they back the findings
from the RANK treatment. ’Risk index’ carries the highest informational value
for the subjects as it is bought most often. ’Gender’ (48%), ’income’ (43%) and
’age’ (43%) are bought more often than the categories ’education’ (24%), ’par-
enthood’ (23%) and the ’family status’ (26%). Second, while non-professionals
exhibit a clear pattern similar to the RANK treatment, no clear distribution
can be found for junior and senior professionals.
Finally, we find a consistent behavior across treatments. Categories for which
advisors choose ”both equal” in SINGLE are bought significantly less often.
Categories that are ranked at higher positions in RANK are bought signifi-
cantly more often in PAY.
Figure 9: Fraction that Buys Category Dependent on Rank of Category
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5 Conclusion
The results of this study contribute to the existing literature in several ways.
A major advantage of our data is that we observe decisions of three relevant
groups of subjects: non-professionals, junior financial professionals and senior
financial professionals.
All subject groups show stereotypes of sociodemographics on risk preferences
that largely coincide with the true correlations. Subjects are able to identify
the relationship of risk attitudes and gender, age, family status and parenthood
correctly. Interestingly, subjects are aware of how their own risk preferences
rank compared to the mean of a representative sample of the population.
Our design allows to investigate to which sociodemographic characteristics sub-
jects attach informational value when assessing the risk attitude of another
person. Especially, gender and a person’s self-assessment of risk preferences
turns out to be a major source of information. We find that subjects pay to
gain information on sociodemographics of the person evaluated. This clearly
demonstrates that subjects attach an informational value to the characteristics
they buy. Hence, such a behavior provides external validity to the strand of
literature that finds only correlations between risk preferences and sociodemo-
graphic characteristics.
We find significant differences in the behavior of different subject groups. Pro-
fessionals are slightly more risk averse than non-professionals. Junior profes-
sionals exhibit the most accurate stereotypes. With respect to regulatory issues,
a person’s self-assessment can be a useful tool. However, we find that especially
experienced professionals are less willing to make use of it. The fact that the
group with the highest counseling experience trusts less in the self-reported risk
measure is interesting from a regulatory perspective as well.
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For Online Publication only
A Instructions of Web Survey
Regarding this survey: Please try to answer all questions. If you do not know
an answer or if you prefer not answer a question please skip it.
General Questions
• Please state: Year of birth, Federal state of birth, Gender, Mother tongue,
Nationality, Religion
• Please state: Do you speak other languages? If so, which?
• Family status: (Please choose: single, divorced, partner, living separated,
married, widowed)
• Number of children: (Please choose: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 or more, none)
Education
• Highest school degree: (Please choose: Abitur, Realschule, Hauptschule,
Sonderschule, no school graduation)
• Please state: How many years have been in school till your highest degree?
• Education: (Please choose: University, Advanced training, Training, in
training, no training)
• State the name/title of your last training:
• Job: (Please choose: Worker, Employee, Employee in public sector, Civil
Servant, in education/training, self-employed, working at my own house-
hold, unemployed, disabled, other)
• Working time: (Please choose: full-time, half-time, part-time but less
than half-time, not working)
• Last executed job (Please state):
• Monthly net income: (Please choose: up toe1,000, e1,001-e3,000, e3,001-
e6,000, more than e6,000)
• Do you own: (Please choose: Bonds, Properties, Security funds, Stocks
or derivatives)
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Lotteries
Lottery 1
You will have to make ten decisions in the table below. In every row of the table
you can choose either Option A or Option B. Option A and Option B are two
lotteries. Your job is to decide on one lottery (either Option A or Option B).
Consider the first row for example: In Option A you receive a payment of e2
with a probability of 10% and a payment of e1.60 with a probability of 90%. If
you imagine a ten-sided-dice this would mean that you receive e2 if you rolled
a 10 and e1.60 for rolling any number between 1 and 9. If you choose Option B
you will receive e3.85 with a probability of 10% and e0.10 with a probability
of 90%. If you again imagine the ten-sided-dice, this would indicate that you
receive e3.85 if you roll a 10 and e0.10 if you roll a number between 1 and 9.
Please decide whether you would choose Option A or Option B in each of the
10 rows:
Lottery 2
Please now consider that it is not possible for you to answer the lottery. You
ask a close confidant to make the following decision for you. On your behalf, the
close confidant is asked to name the preferred option in every row. Please remind
yourself of the persons image and name. You are not able to communicate with
your close confident, you are not able to inform him/her about your decision.
What do you thing, how would this close confident take the decisions in the
following lottery?
Again you find the same table as before in which we ask you for 10 decisions.
As before, you can either choose Option A or Option B. You make your decision
by crossing the option in the column “Your choice”.
Which relationship do you have with the person (e.g., partner, friend, relative
etc.)?
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Other Questions
People can behave differently in different situations.
How would you describe yourself? Are you a risk loving person or do you try
to avoid risks? People behave differently in different areas. How would you
assess your own risk tolerance in the following areas? Please choose a number
on a scale between 0 and 10. A 0 denotes “risk averse” and 10 indicates “fully
prepared to take risks”. You can gradate you assessment with the values in
between. Your risk tolerance....
• when driving? (Please choose: 0,1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10)
• in leisure and sports? (Please choose: 0,1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10)
• in your career? (Please choose: 0,1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10)
• concerning your health? (Please choose: 0,1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10)
• in your trust in unfamiliar people? (Please choose: 0,1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10)
• in financial investments? (Please choose: 0,1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10)
Another question regarding your risk preferences:
Please consider what you would do in the following situation:
Imagine that you had won e100,000 in the lottery. Almost immediately after
you collect the winnings, you receive the following financial offer, the condi-
tions of which are as follows: There is the chance to double the money. It is
equally possible that you could lose half of the amount invested. You have the
opportunity to invest the full amount, part of the amount or reject the offer.
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What share of your lottery winnings would you be prepared to invest in this
financially risky, yet lucrative investment?
What fraction of you winnings do you want to wager on the risky but also
profit-promising lottery?
(Please choose: e100,000; e80,000; e60,000; e40,000; e20,000; nothing, I
would decline the offer)
What is your opinion on the following three statements?
• On the whole one can trust people (Please choose: Totally Agree, agree
slightly, slightly disagree, Disagree Totally)
• Nowadays one can’t rely on anyone (Please choose: Totally Agree, agree
slightly, slightly disagree, Disagree Totally)
• If one is dealing with strangers, it is better to be careful before one can
trust them (Please choose: Totally Agree, agree slightly, slightly disagree,
Disagree Totally)
Would you say that for most of the time, people (Please choose on of
the two possibilities)
• attempt to be helpful?
• or only act in their own interests?
Do you believe that most people (Please choose on of the two possibilities)
• would exploit you if they had the opportunity
• or would attempt to be fair towards you?
What would you say: How many close friends do you have?
How often does it occur that,
• that you lend your friends your personal belongings (i.e., CDs, books, car,
bicycle)? (Please choose: Very Often, Often, Sometime, Seldom, Never)
• that you lend your friends money? (Please choose: Very Often, Often,
Sometime, Seldom, Never)
• that you leave the door to your apartment unlocked? (Please choose: Very
Often, Often, Sometime, Seldom, Never)
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B Instructions of Lab Experiment
Please note:
• Comments to the instructions are printed in italic and were not presented
to the subjects.
• A horizontal line indicates whenever a new window was presented to ad-
visors.
• To ease orientation, treatments as mentioned in the paper are identified
by TREATMENT X.
Instructions of the Lab Experiment:
Goal and Process of the Experiment
The experiment consists of a total of two phases, in each of which you will have
to make decisions. In the first phase we will ask you a number of questions and
you will make two decisions. In the second phase of the experiment you will
make the same set of decisions for other people and your payment will depend
on the accuracy of your decisions.
The e2.65 that you receive for you participation can be used during the ex-
periment - more on that later. You can make money with every decision you
make. We will inform you about your compensation in every round as well as
your total compensation for the entire experiment only after the completion
of the experiment.
Basic Information
Please answer the following general questions. The success of the experiment
depends on you answering the questions carefully.
General Information
• Year of Birth:
• Height in cm:
• Gender: (please choose: male/ female)
• Marital Status: (please choose: Single, Divorced, In a relationship, Living
Separately, Married, Widowed)
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• How many children do you have?: (please choose: no children, one child,
two children, three children, four children, five or more children)
• Enter your highest level of education: (please choose: University, Techni-
cal College, Apprenticeship, Currently a student, Completed Economics
Major, Currently an Economics Major, No vocational education)
• What is your current occupation?: (please choose: white-collar employee,
white-collar civil servant, blue-collar employee, blue-collar civil servant,
civil servant with tenure, student, self-employed, working at home, unable
to work, unemployed, other)
• What are your current working hours?: (please choose: full-time, half-
time, part-time (less than halftime), not employed)
• What is your monthly net income in Euro?: (please choose: Up to e1,000,
e1,001 - e3,000 , e3,001 - e6,000, over e6,000)
How would you describe yourself?
Are you a risk loving person or do you try to avoid risks?
People behave differently in different areas. How would you assess your own
risk tolerance in the following areas?
Please choose a number on a scale between 0 and 10. A 0 denotes ”risk averse”
and 10 indicates ”fully prepared to take risks”. You can gradate you assessment
with the values in between.
You risk tolerance?
• In general? (Please choose: 0,1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10)
• When driving? (Please choose: 0,1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10)
• In leisure and sports? (Please choose: 0,1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10)
• In your career? (Please choose: 0,1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10)
• Concerning your health? (Please choose: 0,1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10)
• In your trust in unfamiliar people? (Please choose: 0,1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10)
• In financial investments? (Please choose: 0,1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10)
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Game Decision I
We will now begin with the first game decision. Please read the instructions
carefully; it is very important that you understand the question.
Game Decision I
Please consider what you would do in the following situation:
Imagine that you had won e100,000 in the lottery. Almost immediately after
you collect the winnings, you receive the following financial offer, the condi-
tions of which are as follows: There is the chance to double the money. It is
equally possible that you could lose half of the amount invested. You have the
opportunity to invest the full amount, part of the amount or reject the offer.
What share of your lottery winnings would you be prepared to invest in this
financially risky, yet lucrative investment?
Your Compensation
In terms of your actual compensation, the e100,000 are equivalent to e2.50
(e80,000 correspond to e2, etc.). Your chosen amount will be entered into
the lottery; the computer draws lots to see if you double or half your wagered
amount.
Your Decision
What fraction of you winnings do you want to wager on the risky but also
profit-promising lottery?
(Please choose: e100,000; e80,000; e60,000; e40,000; e20,000; nothing, I
would decline the offer)
By clicking on NEXT your choices are saved. You cannot change your choices
afterwards. Your compensation will be revealed at the end of the experiment.
Game Decision II
The second game decision is up next. Please read the instructions carefully.
Take your time. It is very important that you thoroughly understand the ques-
tion, since this question will be repeated in different variations throughout the
rest of the experiment.
Game decision II
You will have to make ten decisions in the table below. In every row of the table
you can choose either Option A or Option B. Option A and Option B are two
lotteries. Your job is to decide on one lottery (either Option A or Option B).
Consider the first row for example: In Option A you receive a payment of e2
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with a probability of 10% and a payment of e1.60 with a probability of 90%. If
you imagine a ten-sided-dice this would mean that you receive e2 if you rolled
a 10 and e1.60 for rolling any number between 1 and 9. If you choose Option B
you will receive e3.85 with a probability of 10% and e0.10 with a probability
of 90%. If you again imagine the ten-sided-dice, this would indicate that you
receive e3.85 if you roll a 10 and e0.10 if you roll a number between 1 and 9.
There are two rational strategies in this game:
• you choose Option A at the beginning before switching to Option B for
the rest of the rows
• you choose Option B for all of the rows
We are interested in finding out in which row you first choose Option B. Please
specify the row in which you will first choose Option B below the table. If you
only choose Option B, please enter a 1.
Your Compensation
A random row will be chosen for your actual Euro-payment. Your chosen option
will be applied to this row. The realization of either the higher or the lower
payment for a certain option will be chosen randomly. If the seventh row is
chosen for example and you have decided on option A, you will receive e2 with
a 70% probability and e1.60 with a 30% probability.
Your Decision
I choose option B the first time in row: (Please choose: 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10)
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By clicking on NEXT your choices are saved. You cannot change your choices
afterwards. Your profit and your compensation will be revealed at the end of
the experiment.
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TREATMENT SINGLE
How do other people decide?
In the rest of the experiment you will have to estimate how other people made
the game decisions that you just made.
Game Decision 1
Ca. 22,000 participants answered the Game Decision I in a preliminary survey.
Remember, the wording of Game Decision 1 was:
To shorten the experimental instructions, we will subsequently refer to this de-
scription of Game Decision 1 as “DESCRIPTION GAME DECISION 1”.
Please consider what you would do in the following situation: Imagine that
you had won e100,000 in the lottery. Almost immediately after you collect the
winnings, you receive the following financial offer, the conditions of which are
as follows: There is the chance to double the money. It is equally possible that
you could lose half of the amount invested. You have the opportunity to invest
the full amount, part of the amount or reject the offer. What share of your
lottery winnings would you be prepared to invest in this financially risky, yet
lucrative investment?
• e100,000
• e80,000
• e60,000
• e40,000
• e20,000
• Nothing, I would decline the offer
Your Compensation
You will receive e0.25 for every correct assessment.
Do you think the average participant of the preliminary survey wa-
gered more, less, or the same amount of money as you did in the first
game decision?
Your Decision
I think that the average participant of the preliminary survey wagered
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(Please Choose: More, less, the same amount of)
money as I did in the first game decision.
How do you think certain groups within the preliminary survey de-
cided?
Your Decision
Who wagered more money in the lottery?
• Gender: (please choose: men, women, both groups wagered the same
amount)
• Age: (please choose: older (40 and up), younger (below 40), both groups
wagered the same amount)
• Marital Status: (please choose: single, married or in a relationship, both
groups wagered the same amount)
• Level of Education: (please choose: participants with a university degree,
participants without a university degree, both groups wagered the same
amount)
• Number of Children: (please choose: participants with children, partici-
pants without children, both groups wagered the same amount)
• Income Category: (please choose: participants with a net monthly income
up to e1,000, participants with a net monthly income above e1,000, both
groups wagered the same amount)
By clicking on NEXT your choices are saved. You cannot change your choices
afterwards. Your compensation will be revealed at the end of the experiment.
How do other people decide?
Game Decision II
In another survey 190 people responded to Game Decision II. The characteris-
tics of the participants were also documented.
Remember, the wording of Game Decision 2 was:
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To shorten the experimental instructions, we will subsequently refer to this de-
scription of Game Decision 1 as “DESCRIPTION GAME DECISION 2”.
You will have to make ten decisions in the table below. In every row of the table
you can choose either Option A or Option B. Option A and Option B are two
lotteries. Your job is to decide on one lottery (either Option A or Option B).
Consider the first row for example: In Option A you receive a payment of e2
with a probability of 10% and a payment of e1.60 with a probability of 90%. If
you imagine a ten-sided-dice this would mean that you receive e2 if you rolled
a 10 and e1.60 for rolling any number between 1 and 9. If you choose Option B
you will receive e3.85 with a probability of 10% and e0.10 with a probability
of 90%. If you again imagine the ten-sided-dice, this would indicate that you
receive e3.85 if you roll a 10 and e0.10 if you roll a number between 1 and 9.
We are interested in finding out in which row you first choose Option B. Please
specify the row in which you will first choose Option B below the table. If you
only choose Option B, please enter a 1.
Your Compensation
You will receive e0.25 for every correct assessment.
Do you think the participants in the preliminary survey switched to
Option B earlier (so in a row with a smaller row number), later, or
at the same time as you did?
Your decision
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I think that on average, the participants in the preliminary survey switched to
option B Please Choose (earlier, later, at the same place) as I did.
How do you think certain groups within the preliminary survey de-
cided?
Your decision
Which group switched to option B earlier (so in a row with a smaller row
number)?
• Gender: (please choose: men, women, both in the same row)
• Age: (please choose: older (40 and up), younger (below 40), both in the
same row)
• Marital Status: (please choose: single, married or in a relationship, both
in the same row)
• Level of Education: (please choose: participants with a university degree,
participants without a university degree, both in the same row)
• Number of Children: (please choose: participants with children, partici-
pants without children, both in the same row)
• Income Category: (please choose: participants with a net monthly income
up to e1,000, participants with a net monthly income above e1,000, both
in the same row)
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TREATMENT SIMULT RANK
In this section you are supposed to estimate how other people decided in the
Game Decisions that you have just made. The better your estimation, the
higher your compensation will be. You will receive some information about the
persons whose decision behavior you are trying to predict.
It is important to understand what information is subsumed in certain charac-
teristics. Please carefully read the characteristics and the possible manifesta-
tions of these characteristics.
The following characteristics are available:
1. Age
2. Level of Education
• University
• Technical College
• Apprenticeship
• Still in Apprenticeship
• Currently an Economics Major
• No vocational education
3. Income (current monthly net income)
• Up to e1,000
• e1,001 -e3,000
• e3,001 -e6,000
• over e6,000
4. Marital Status
• Single
• Divorced
• In a relationship
• Living Separately
• Married
• Widowed
5. Gender
• Male
• Female
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6. Children
• Has children
• Has no children
7. Risk disposition concerning financial investments
• Answer to the question: Are you risk loving when it comes to finan-
cial investments or do you try to avoid financial risks? Please choose
a number on a scale between 0 and 10. A 0 denotes ”risk averse”
and a 10 indicates ”fully prepared to take risks”.
You will only have to assess how a single person decided in the two Game Deci-
sions, so you will have to evaluate a specific person. You are paid according to
the accuracy of your assessment. If you correctly assess how the presented per-
son acted in both decisions, you will receive e0.50 for every correct prediction.
In order to make your assessment, you will make the decisions you previously
made for yourself for the specific person instead.
The information available for assessing the person will consist of a selection of
the seven characteristics presented above. You will not receive all seven of the
person’s characteristics. Instead, we will generate a random number between
1 and 7 that corresponds with the number of revealed characteristics. If the
randomly generated number is a 3, for example, you will receive the first three
characteristics of the person that you are assessing.
You can now decide which characteristic you want to assign to the first position,
the second position, all the way to the seventh position. Make you decisions
carefully; characteristics with a higher position are revealed with a higher prob-
ability.
Your Decision
Sort the characteristics by clicking and dragging the characteristics to the po-
sitions you want them in.
The characteristic at the top of the list has the highest prioritization; the second
characteristic has the second-highest characterization etc.
Note: The characteristics are presented in alphabetic order
• Level of Education
• Income category
• Marital Status
• Year of Birth
• Gender
• Has Children
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• Risk disposition concerning financial investments
This window appeared 4 times with differing number of characteristics shown
How do you assess other people?
The person has the following characteristics: Since x was drawn as the random
number you receive the first x of the characteristics that you had chosen for the
person that you are assessing.
• ...
• ...
Game Decision I
What decision do you think the person above made in the game’s first round?
Remember, the wording of Game Decision I was:
DESCRIPTION GAME DECISION 1
Your Compensation
If you make exactly the same decision as the described person, you will receive
e0.50. If your decision does not correspond with the described person’s deci-
sion, you will not receive any money.
Your Decision
What fraction of you winnings do you want to wager on the risky but also
profit-promising lottery?
(Please choose: e100,000; e80,000; e60,000; e40,000; e20,000; nothing, I
would decline the offer)
Game Decision II
What decision do you think the person described above made in the game’s
second round? Remember, the wording of Game Decision 2 was:
DESCRIPTION GAME DECISION 2
Your Compensation
If you make exactly the same decision as the described person, you will receive
e0.50. If your decision does not correspond with the described person’s deci-
sion, you will not receive any money.
Your Decision
Please try to make the same decision as the person described above made. We
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are interested in finding out in which row you first choose Option B. Please
specify the row in which you will first choose Option B.
The person chooses Option B for the first time in row: (Please choose: 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10)
By clicking on NEXT your choices are saved. You cannot change your choices
afterwards. Your compensation will be revealed at the end of the experiment.
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TREATMENT SIMULT PAY
This and the following window appeared 4 times.
How do you assess other people?
In this round you will have to assess four other people again. As in the previous
round, you will be given a selection of the seven characteristics shown above
to help facilitate your decision-making process. This time, however, you can
choose which of the characteristics of the person you are assessing you want to
have revealed. You have to pay for every revealed characteristic.
As you can garner from the table below, the costs of the characteristics vary.
The first characteristic costs e0.01, die second e0.02 etc. The seventh charac-
teristic costs e0.50. The right-hand column of the table displays the total costs.
If you want to see all seven characteristics of the person you are assessing, for
example, you will be charged e0.99.
Cost of Characteristic Total cost
1. Characteristic e0.01 e0.01
2. Characteristic e0.02 e0.03
3. Characteristic e0.03 e0.06
4. Characteristic e0.06 e0.12
5. Characteristic e0.12 e0.24
6. Characteristic e0.25 e0.49
7. Characteristic e0.50 e0.99
Your compensation is as follows:
Compensation for Game Decision I + Compensation for Game Deci-
sion II - Payment for Characteristics
As in the previous round you will receive e0.50 for Game Decision 1 and e0.50
for Game Decision 2 if your assessment proves to be correct.
The costs of buying certain characteristics will be subtracted from your com-
pensation. If, for example, your assessment for Game Decision I is correct and
your evaluation for Game Decision II is not and you have bought three charac-
teristics, you will receive (e0.50+ e0 -e0.06=e0.44).
Please note: Since you have winnings from previous rounds and the e2.65 that
we put at your disposal at the beginning of the game, your total compensation
cannot be negative.
Please decide on the characteristics that you want to buy now:
• Age
• Level of Education
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• Income
• Marital Status
• Gender
• Children
• Risk disposition concerning financial investments
By clicking on NEXT your choices are saved. You cannot change your choices
afterwards. Your compensation will be revealed at the end of the experiment.
How do you assess other people?
The person has the following characteristics:
You have bought x characteristics. The person you are supposed to assess has
the following characteristics:
• ...
• ...
Game Decision I
What decision do you think the person above made in the game’s first round?
Remember, the wording of Game Decision I was:
DESCRIPTION GAME DECISION 1
Your compensation
If you make exactly the same decision as the described person, you will receive
e0.50. If your decision does not correspond with the described person’s deci-
sion, you will not receive any money.
Your Decision
What fraction of you winnings do you want to wager on the risky but also
profit-promising lottery?
(Please choose: e100,000; e80,000; e60,000; e40,000; e20,000; nothing, I
would decline the offer)
Game Decision II
What decision do you think the person described above made in the game’s
second round?
Remember, the wording of Game Decision 2 was:
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DESCRIPTION GAME DECISION 2
Your Compensation
If you make exactly the same decision as the described person, you will receive
e0.50. If your decision does not correspond with the described person’s deci-
sion, you will not receive any money.
Your Decision
Please try to make the same decision as the person described above made. We
are interested in finding out in which row you first choose Option B. Please
specify the row in which you will first choose Option B.
The person chooses Option B for the first time in row:
(Please choose: 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10)
By clicking on NEXT your choices are saved. You cannot change your choices
afterwards. Your compensation will be revealed at the end of the experiment.
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Questions
Please answer the following questions.
Note: The questions refer to the entire experiment.
1. Do you know one of the persons on the pictures? If yes, which one(s)?
2. Which of the people on the pictures would you trust most with you money?
Please indicate a picture number.
3. Do you think that the provided information was sufficient? What ad-
ditional information about the individuals you assessed would you have
liked to have had?
4. Do you generally believe that it is possible to evaluate the decisions of
other people?
5. Were you more confident making you assessments on the basis of the
picture or of the profile (with the characteristics)?
6. Did you have a certain strategy in making your assessments? If yes, please
describe briefly.
7. When you think back to your last counseling session at your bank, did you
have the feeling that you counselor could assess your preferences/wishes
well?
By clicking on NEXT your choices are saved. You cannot edit your answers
afterwards.
Your compensation
Calculation of your compensation
You total payment comprises the compensation for every single round.
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Basic amount ex
Part 1
Game Decision 1 ex
Game Decision 2 ex
Part 2
Pre-survey Assessment Game Decision I ex
Game Decision II ex
Part 3
Ordering Characteristics Round 1: ex
Round 2: ex
Round 3: ex
Round 4 ex
Buying Round 1: ex
Purchase Price: ex
Round 2: ex
Purchase Price: ex
Round 3: ex
Purchase Price: ex
Round 4 ex
Purchase Price: ex
Pictures Round 1: ex
Round 2: ex
Round 3: ex
Round 4: ex
Total Compensation ex
Payment Procedure
We will make the payments according to your ID (identification number)
You will find a receipt among the documents in front of you. Please enter your
total compensation, your ID, and selected other information in the acknowledg-
ment form.
Important: Do not close the browser window. Raise your hand as soon as you
are finished.
Thank you for your participation
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